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INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter explores a theoretical and practical paradox in megaprojects. According to 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975) high uncertainty, high asset specificity, 
situated knowledge and the high frequency of transactions associated with megaprojects 
should drive managers to internalise resources and to rely on relational communication 
and informal contracts. However, in the context of mega-projects this presents the 
following paradox: managerial incentives to invest in internal resources through vertical 
integration are limited because of fixed time horizons and obdurate delivery deadlines; 
yet, the alternative of outsourcing and contract management through the market 
mechanism based on formal communication implies the escalation of transaction costs. 
This research therefore seeks to identify how practitioners might resolve this issue  
through enhanced communication as well as more efficient collaboration practices in 
order to overcome the technical, psychological and political barriers that impact on 
effective delivery of megaprojects (Flyvbjerg, 2006). This chapter also analyses the  
extent to which the transaction costs approach can be used to explain the economic  
organisation of temporary governance structures such as megaprojects.  
 
Thus, the aim of the chapter is to provide a new conceptual framework for the 
understanding of megaprojects, as governance structures that rely to a large extent on 
communication practices for effective coordination. Following a brief overview of the 
difference forms of governance associated with different kinds of organisations (section 
I), this chapter shows that the hybrid form is, to a certain degree, the most suited to 
megaprojects (section II). Yet, the temporary nature of megaprojects as organisations 
introduces a distinctive and additional dimension to this hybrid form of governance, that 
is not typically considered by the transaction cost approach to organizations (section III). 
The notions of ‘swift trust’ (Meyerson et al., 1996) and of mutual knowledge in a context 
of communities of practice are proposed as concepts to address this lacuna.     
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I. TRANSACTION COST APPROACH AND THE GOVERNANCE 
PARADOX IN MEGAPROJECTS  
 
 
Organisational theories of comparative corporate governance are not new and were, to a 
large extent, initiated with the publication of Ronald Coase’s classic article on the 
‘Nature of the Firm’ published in Economica in 1937. Coase raised fundamental 
questions about the concept of the firm in economic theory and, more importantly, 
suggested that the comparative costs of organising transactions through markets rather 
than within firms were the main determinants of the scope and size of firms. In 1975, 
Oliver Williamson significantly elaborated Coase’s theory of the firm into a transaction 
cost framework which gave rise to a series of publications and to the modern transaction 
costs approach. In particular, Williamson deepened the discussions of why firms might 
perform better than markets and argued that markets are coordinated by the price 
mechanism and rely on formal contracts (enforceable by a court and incomplete), 
whereas firms are coordinated by hierarchy and rely on “relational contracts” (informal 
agreements not adjudicated by courts which overcome the difficulties of incomplete 
contracts).  
 
Over the last two decades, a series of criticisms have been addressed to Williamson’s 
development on several grounds. While some argued that transaction costs economics 
(TCE) will remain “bad for practice” (Ghoshal, Moran, 1996), others questioned 
Williamson’s dichotomous view of markets and hierarchies (Powell, 1990). As a result of 
the latter critique, Williamson reconsidered his polarised view of governance structures 
and introduced the notion of a hybrid form of organization as an intermediate structure 
sharing characteristics of both firms and markets. In Williamson’s own words, the hybrid 
mode is characterized by: 
“(…) semi-strong incentives, an intermediate degree of administrative apparatus, 
displays semi-strong adaptations of both kinds, and works out of a semi-legalistic 
contract law regime. As compared with market and hierarchy, which are polar 
opposites, the hybrid mode is located between the two of these in all five attribute 
respects.” (Williamson, 1991: 281) 
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Yet, Williamson was also careful to note that “the abstract attributes that characterize 
alternative modes of governance have remained obscure” (Ibid.: 269).  
 
In this paper, we explore the question of where megaprojects, as a distinctive 
organisational phenomena can be positioned along this scale of governance structures. By 
doing so, we aim to establish a theoretical basis for explaining the extremely poor 
performance track record of megaprojects that has been thoroughly documented by 
authors such as Flyvbjerg (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, 2004, 2005, Flyvbjerg, 2005a, 2005b, 
2009). This literature has emphasised the extensive failure of megaprojects and offered 
three main reasons for this: technical uncertainty, psychological effects such as optimism 
bias and political factors such as strategic misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg, 2006). However, 
the focus of this literature has mainly been on the dynamics of the early planning stages 
of mega-projects rather than the organizational arrangements and dynamics of 
megaprojects at different stages of the life-cycle. We argue that the scale and scope of 
megaprojects in terms of budget, life-span, number of employees and social impact 
render them comparable to large ‘permanent’ organizational forms such as firms. In light 
of this, it is an appropriate endeavour to evaluate the extent to which organizational 
theory grounded in notions of relatively clear-cut governance structures such as the firm 
and the market can also account for the challenges associated with managing 
megaprojects. This observation echoes the wider point, now well established in the 
project management literature, that organisational theories have been underexplored in 
terms of their potential contribution to understanding project and temporary organisations 
(van Donk and Molloy, 2008). The pluridisciplinary nature of our research bringing 
together organizational economics and project management literature suggests that the 
poor performance of megaprojects cannot be understood outside an organizational 
conceptual framework, therefore adapting existing organizational approaches to the field 
of megaprojects management is justified. In this paper, we specifically focus on how 
communication practices might allow managers to overcome the ‘make or buy’ tension 
that is central to the governance paradox in finite megaprojects. 
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Yet, we recognise that the familiar market-hierarchy dichotomy does not do justice to the 
notion of megaprojects and to their unique form of economic exchange. The transaction 
cost approach to organizations suggests sharp boundaries to firms with competitors as 
outside boundaries and inside managers exercising authority and opportunistic behaviour. 
In contrast, megaprojects typically engage in collaborations that resemble neither the 
“familiar alternative of arms’ length market contracting” nor “the former ideal of vertical 
integration” (Powell, 1990: 297). On the one hand, megaprojects cannot be understood as 
an autonomous market form of organization, due to the nature of the contracts between 
the different parties of the project. Further, megaprojects are not supported by classical 
contract law theory since although the parties to the transaction are autonomous, they are 
largely dependent on each other. Moreover, the existence of dependences and strong 
cooperation between the different parties contradicts Williamson’s definition of a market 
form of organization exclusively coordinated by a price mechanism and supported by 
bilateral relationships. Rather, megaprojects generally take place within complex and 
multiparty contractual relationships and the participants’ behaviours are, to a large extent, 
sheltered from market forces. On the other hand, neither can megaprojects be understood 
as vertically integrated on the basis of formal fiat, as firms are. A hierarchical structure 
based on clear departmental boundaries, clean lines of authority, detailed reporting 
mechanisms and formal decision-making procedures does not reflect megaprojects’ 
reality of sharp fluctuations, complexity and unanticipated changes that arise as a result 
of factors such as the political nature of the operating environment and technological 
novelty. 
 
Still, according to Williamson, the choice to internalise resources (through a mechanism 
of vertically integrated organisation – to ‘make’) depends on four main variables, namely 
high uncertainty, high asset specificity, situated knowledge and the high frequency of 
transactions, all of which are pertinent in the context of megaprojects. Yet, as outlined in 
the introduction of this chapter, megaprojects managers do not have the option to 
internalise resources to the same extent as managers in ‘permanent’ organisations 
because of the temporary and finite nature of the project organization. This observation 
suggests a requirement for a definition of megaproject governance structures that is 
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distinct from both market and hierarchy. In light of this, the obvious next step is to assess 
the extent to which the ‘hybrid forms’ of organization systematised and modelled in 
Williamson’s seminal paper published in 19911 apply to megaprojects. 
 
II. MEGAPROJECTS AS HYBRID FORMS OF ORGANIZATION?  
 
The notion of hybrid form refers to a diverse range of economic organizations (drawn on 
the market-hierarchy continuum) and led to a large amount of academic interest in the 
1990s. To some scholars, the increasing trend of interest in this notion has contributed to 
“a rather messy situation marked by a cacophony of heterogeneous concepts, theories, 
and research results” (Oliver, Ebers, 1998: 550). Nevertheless, while the purpose of this 
section is neither to review the impressive literature already available nor to generate one 
more study of hybrid forms per se, as mentioned earlier, its aim is to assess the 
significance of megaprojects as a hybrid form of governance. The generic meaning of a 
hybrid form is unclear and as noted by a recent commentator, “when it comes to 
intermediate arrangements, the terrain is a shifting one. The vocabulary itself is not 
stabilized” (Menard, 2004: 347). As suggested by Powell in 1990, the continuum of 
governance structures is organized as follows:  
“Moving from the market pole, where prices capture all the relevant information 
necessary for exchange, we find putting-out systems, various kinds of repeated 
trading, quasi-firms and subcontracting arrangements; toward the hierarchy pole, 
franchising, joint ventures, decentralized profit centres and matrix management are 
located.” (Powell, 1990: 297) 
 
Assuming that megaprojects governance structures belong to this continuum does not 
appear very helpful at an operational level. The governance paradox formulated in the 
previous section raises the question as to which hybrid form offers a solution to this 
paradox. The transaction cost approach implicitly assumes that organisations are 
orientated towards stability, growth and long-term sustainability which is in direct 
                                                
1 Interestingly, this notion of hybrid form was introduced by Williamson earlier in his 1985 Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism, in which he summarized his views as follows: “Whereas I was earlier of the 
view that transactions of the middle kind were very difficult to organize and hence were unstable, (…) I am 
now persuaded that transactions in the middle range are much more common.” (Williamson, 1985: 83) 
However, it was only in 1991 that he formalised the concept of hybrids.  
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contrast to the central principle of organisation of megaprojects which are orientated to 
delivery of specific outcomes within a finite horizon. Further, megaprojects have a range 
of other features that are not shared by permanent organisations, summarised by 
Flyvbjerg (2009). 
 
Risk, complexity, non-standard technologies, multi-player processes and lock-in 
phenomena indicate a non-linear growth process which is limited by deadlines and time 
commitments. These temporary forms of organizations are, to a large extent, driven by an 
external growth in which pre-existing networks of relationships, based on trust, 
reputation and cooperation enable megaprojects to emerge and develop. In a way, this 
non-linear growth is implicitly mentioned in Williamson’s analysis of joint-ventures. 
Interestingly, Williamson argued: 
“Joint-ventures that are designed to give a respite should be distinguished from the 
types of hybrid modes analyzed here, which are of an equilibrium kind” (Williamson, 
1991: 293).  
 
Unfortunately, Williamson did not further develop any explanation of these ‘non-
equilibrium kind’ of joint-ventures. Therefore, it seems that megaprojects belong to a 
family of organizational form in need of an explanatory theory which needs fresh 
insights. As a modest step in this direction, the following table represents an overview of 
the key differences between market, hierarchy and two hybrid forms, namely network 
and megaproject. The first three columns are based on Powell’s well-known article 
published in 1990. The relevant aspect of this comparison is concerned with the key 
feature of megaprojects. The temporary nature of project-based organizations reveals 
time-limited cooperation supported by multiparty contractual relationships.  
 
Key Features Market Hierarchy Network Megaproject 
Normative Basis Contract – Property Rights 
Employment 
Relationship 
Complementary 
Strengths 
Temporary 
Cooperation/ 
Multiparty 
Contractual 
Relationships 
Means of 
Communication Prices Routines Relational 
Temporary 
Relational - 
Transfer of 
knowledge 
Methods of Haggling – Resort Administrative Fiat Norms of Swift trust –  
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Conflict Resolution to Courts for 
Enforcement 
– Supervision Reciprocity – 
Reputational 
Concerns 
We-Rationality 
Degree of 
Flexibility High Low Medium Very High 
Amount of 
Commitment 
Among the Parties 
Low Medium to High Medium to High Very High 
Tone or Climate Precision and/or Suspicion 
Formal, 
Bureaucratic 
Open Ended, 
Mutual 
Benefits 
Innovation, 
Communities of 
Practice 
Actor Preferences 
or Choices Independent Dependent Interdependent 
Mutually 
Interdependent 
 
Table 1 – Stylised Comparisons of Four Forms of Economic Organization: Market, Hierarchy, 
Network and Megaproject (based on Powell, 1990: 300) 
 
Here, the notion of temporary relates to organisations whose members may have never 
worked together before and who may not expect to work together again as a group 
(Jarvenpaa, Leidner, 1999: 792). Facilitating factors usually identified to favour trust, 
such as shared social norms, repeated interactions, shared experiences and anticipation of 
future association (Powell, 1990) are often less significant in the context of megaprojects, 
mainly because of their stand-alone, one-off nature. As a result, megaprojects establish 
their communication practices on temporary transfers of knowledge based on ‘swift trust’ 
(Meyerson, Weick, Kramer, 1996; Gold, 2005(b)) due to the need for flexibility2. Swift 
trust applies to social groups that include members with diverse skills, a very limited 
history of working together, and uncertain prospects of future collaboration. It is suited to 
the context of megaprojects since the theory of swift trust assumes clear role divisions 
among members who have well-defined specialities. The fixed-time horizons of 
megaprojects create few incentives for deep relationship building and prevent project 
members from gathering first-hand information. In particular, swift trust refers to the 
“willingness to trust strangers and a positive expectation that the group activity will be 
beneficial before it even starts” (Ibid.: 16). It is only after the project members have 
begun to interact that trust is maintained by a “highly active, proactive, enthusiastic, 
generative style of action” (Meyerson, Weick, Kramer, 1996: 180).  
                                                
2 More generally, it is argued that a person trusts a group when that person believes that the group “(a) 
makes a good-faith effort to behave in accordance with any commitments both explicit or implicit, (b) is 
honest in whatever negotiations preceded such commitments, and (c) does not take excessive advantage of 
another even when the opportunity is available” (Cummings, Bromiley, 1996: 303).  
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Whereas the network form of governance reveals a medium degree of flexibility and a 
medium to high amount of commitment among the parties, the complexity inherent to 
and the uncertainty associated with megaprojects make both of these variables very high. 
In addition, innovative processes and the emergence of communities of practice could be 
a solution to address the high degree of flexibility required by the nature of megaprojects. 
In terms of actors’ preferences, interdependences are the only way to execute very large 
projects. The need for cooperation and collaboration is a critical requirement and is 
achieved through the development of complementary skills, acceptance of ideas, 
knowledge transfer, reflection, dialogue and experimentation.  
 
In the context of megaprojects, the solution to the governance paradox may not be the 
adoption of a hybrid organizational form (Williamson, 1991; Menard, 1997) combining 
elements of authority and market mechanisms, but instead might be an exploration of 
alternative forms of governance, such as communities of practice that focus on 
knowledge and explicitly enable the management of knowledge to be placed in the hands 
of practitioners (McDermott, Snyder, Wenger, 2002). The self-managing nature of these 
communities combines a bottom-up as well as a top-down process which encourages 
collective learning from past mistakes, capturing learning into remembered repositories 
and refined practices for future use.  
 
In contrast with other governance forms, megaprojects are characterised by temporary 
cooperation between multiparty contractual actors. Communication between different 
members involved in a megaproject is therefore based on transfer of knowledge between 
various experts. Yet, as megaprojects are often one-off events (Priemus, Flyvbjerg, van 
Wee, 2008: 12), it is therefore often difficult to refer to past mutual knowledge to resolve 
problems. In this sense, mutual knowledge established in such an organisation is rather 
based on interactional dynamics than on direct knowledge (Cramton, 2001: 347). Mutual 
knowledge increases the likelihood that communication will be understood and can be 
established through interaction in the case of megaprojects. As a result, relationships are 
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based on swift trust (Meyerson, Weick, Kramer, 1996: 167) in a context of we-rationality 
(Arena, Conein, 2008).  According to Meyerson and his colleagues:  
“Swift trust is a form of trust that is created in temporary system, a system that 
demonstrates behaviour that presupposes trust. Hence sources of trust like familiarity, 
shared experience, reciprocal disclosure, threats and deterrents, fulfilled promises, and 
demonstrations of non-exploitation of vulnerability - are not obvious in such system.” 
(Meyerson, Weick, Kramer, 1996: 167) 
 
Megaprojects’ key features, such as communication, cooperation, collaboration, very 
high flexibility and transfers of knowledge between different parties can take three main 
forms: teams, communities of practice (intra- and/or inter-organizational) and epistemic 
communities. The exploration of alternative forms of governance is based on the 
literature developing the concept of communities of practice (Amin, Cohendet, 2004; 
Wenger, 1998) that differ significantly from work teams (Gold, 2005). While teams are 
formed by management and respond to specific deliverables, communities of practice 
emerge from a voluntary basis and have no specific deliverables imposed by the 
management. More specifically, Michael Bacharach provided a clear definition of what a 
team was; he claimed that3: 
“A team is a group of agents with a common goal which can only be achieved by 
appropriate combinations of individual activities. This teamwork is a species of 
cooperation. (…) Teams may be long-lived institutions like terrorist cells, or 
ephemeral products of circumstances like three passers-by giving a motorist a push-
start. Communication may be minimal (…).” (2005: xxi) 
 
Individual members of a team tend to have private interests as well as collective 
incentives. However, while Bacharach and his colleagues (2005) provide a frame of 
analysis for the concept of “we-reasoning” or “team-reason”, they do not explain as such 
logic of collective action may arise. Yet, they claimed that we-reasoning enables agents 
to reach ‘coordination points’ described as “many different ways in which groups of 
                                                
3 Michael Bacharach was a Professor of Economics and the Director of the research unit on Bounded 
Rationality in Economic Behaviour at Oxford University. He assumed an existing psychological tendency 
for individuals to see themselves as members of “teams”, rather than as isolated, independent, agents. To 
him, there are times when their psychology leads individuals to act in accordance with the answer not to 
“What should I do?” but to “What should we do?”. His death in 2002 left Bacharach’s research programme 
unfinished. 
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agents with a common goal can achieve it” (Ibid.: xxii)4. Margaret Gilbert (2005) went 
one step further in the analysis of teams and suggested that this specific form of 
cooperation was characterised by a stronger condition, related to joint-commitment that 
involved collective intention as well as joint responsibility (also defined as obligations to 
other members of the team)5.  
 
To a large extent though, this form of cooperation and of communication follows the 
rational choice paradigm and, as stated, does not provide much material about the nature 
of the cooperation and the communication between the different parties of a megaproject 
team. Hence, the solution to the governance paradox has to be found in overlapping 
communities – as parts of the megaproject organisation – which have a dominant mode of 
learning and collective behaviour to encourage the creation of knowledge repositories 
and refined practices in a context of high uncertainty. Whereas megaprojects managers 
do not have enough time to invest internally and when it is too costly for them to 
exclusively use resources from the market, the alternative governance structure should 
gather a collective of communities. This collective should have a reasonable degree of 
autonomy and independence, yet evolving within a structured temporary organisation6. 
This specific form of governance would be rather well-positioned to be highly innovative 
and to deal with organisational discontinuities inherent in megaprojects.    
 
                                                
4 In these specific circumstances, communication is crucial between the different parties of a megaproject. 
According to Bacharach, “[w]hen communication is not possible, it is far from obvious how agents will 
manage to identify the same coordination point as each other; and if they go for different ones there will be 
a ‘coordination failure’. (…) This leads them to ‘team reason’. In philosophy, team reasoning provides a 
new account of ‘collective intentions’ and, in its ‘circumspect’ variety which allows for possible ‘lapsing’ 
by some team members (…).” (Ibid.: xxii)  
5 In particular, Gilbert argued (2005: 25): “(…) joint commitments come about in two ways. In the primary 
case, each party must express to the others his or her readiness to be jointly committed with them in the 
relevant way, in conditions of ‘common knowledge’. Roughly, these expressions must be ‘entirely out in 
the open’ from the point of view of the parties. When and only when all the expressions are made, the joint-
commitment exists. In the secondary or authority-­‐involving	  case,	  the	  parties	  jointly	  commit	  to	  allowing	  some	  person	  or	  body	  to	  create	  new	  joint	  commitments	  for	  them	  in	  some	  relevant	  domain,	  possibly	  without	  their	  knowledge.	  For	  example,	  the	  parties	  may	  jointly	  commit	  to	  accepting	  as	  a	  body	  that	  a	  certain	  person	  or	  body	  may	  make	  decisions	  for	  them,	  in	  effect	  jointly	  committing	  them	  to	  intend	  as	  a	  body	  to	  perform	  certain	  actions”.	  
6 The best example of this kind of organisational arrangement is, to a large extent, science-based 
megaprojects which gather private companies and university researchers (Knorr-Cetina, 1999).  
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Communities of practice and epistemic communities are perhaps the most relevant types 
of alternative governance structures to the governance paradox of megaprojects, since 
they are often considered as cooperation forms in which knowledge creations are more 
likely to occur. Communities of practice can be seen as a way to enhance individual and 
collective competencies through the sharing of a common repertoire of resources. This 
organisational form follows the principle of self-organization and aims to improve 
problem-solving (working together on a specific problem when stuck) and enhances 
mapping knowledge and identifying gaps (knowing what is missed and what other groups 
could be connected to). A community of practice is therefore more than just a community 
of interests; it develops a genuine shared practice built on ways of addressing recurring 
problems, personal experiences, stories and tools. It is from this shared practice that a 
community’s member relies on the knowledge capitalised by the community to carry out 
further activity. Epistemic communities take a slightly different form, as notions of 
autonomy and identity are weaker than in communities of practice. An epistemic 
community can be defined as a group of “agents working on a commonly acknowledged 
subset of knowledge issues and who at the very least accept a commonly understood 
procedural authority as essential to the success of their knowledge activities” (Cowan et 
al., 1998, quoted in Cohendet, Creplet, Dupouët, 2001: 7). Hence, epistemic communities 
are structured around a defined goal to attain and a procedural authority endowed by 
themselves to reach that goal. Both communities locate mutual knowledge at the heart of 
their functioning. In both cases, mutual knowledge consists not only of the information 
itself but also of the awareness that the others know it.  
 
Both categories of communities (epistemic communities and communities of practice) are 
based on “management by content”, supported by “distributed cognition and joined with 
communitarian mechanisms” (Knorr-Cetina, 1999). In particular, the form of leadership 
significantly differs from the vertically integrated structure of governance suggested by 
Williamson in the sense that leaders are not necessarily the “top” of a megaproject, nor its 
“spearhead” pointing forward, but are centrally placed within it. As argued by Knorr-
Cetina in her example of physicists’ experiments, managers “were centrally located in the 
conversation conducted within the collaboration” (Knorr-Cetina, 1999: 181).  
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To summarize the different hybrid forms we have considered so far, Table 2 is 
reproduced from Cohendet, Creplet, Dupouët, 2001. The functional group corresponds to 
Williamson’s concept of hierarchy.  
  
Objective  Agents Cognitive Activity  
Recruitment 
Rule 
Knowledge 
Production 
and 
Dominant 
Learning 
Mode 
What Holds 
the 
Community 
Together 
Functional 
Group 
Ensure a 
given 
function 
Homogeneous Disciplinary Specialisation Hierarchical 
Unintended 
Learning by 
doing 
Education       
Task definition 
Team Realise a given task Heterogeneous 
Integration of 
functional 
knowledge 
Team's leader 
Unintended 
Learning by 
interacting 
Job 
requirements 
Common goals 
Network 
Mutually 
negotiated 
specialisation 
Heterogeneous Knowledge exchange Mutual Trust 
Intended or 
unintended 
depending on 
the network 
Learning by 
exchanging 
Need to access 
complementary 
knowledge 
Community 
of Practice 
Increase the 
skills in a 
given 
practice 
Homogeneous 
Accumulate 
knowledge 
about a given 
practice 
Circulation of 
best practices 
Members 
who select 
themselves 
Unintended 
Learning in 
working 
Common 
passion for the 
practice 
Epistemic 
Community 
Produce 
knowledge Heterogeneous 
Construction 
of knowledge 
or language or 
messages 
Circulation of 
codified 
knowledge 
By peers Intended Searching 
Respect of a 
procedural 
authority 
 
 
Table 2 – Five Hybrid Forms: From the Functional Group to the Epistemic Community (Cohendet, 
Creplet, Dupouët, 2001) 
 
Whereas a community of practice seems to constitute the best solution to the governance 
paradox of megaprojects, the concept of inter-organizational communities of practice 
appears to be even more suited (Moingeon et al., 2005). As with other hybrid forms, 
inter-organizational communities of practice (IOCoP) move away from polar 
organizational forms such as the market and the firm, leading to the reduction of 
transaction costs, a better coordination of practices and collective learning from 
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experience. According to recent literature, these forms of organization could be 
characterized by two main permanent features. The first is the “coordination of 
experience, knowledge and resources” and the second is the “recourse to relational, 
implicit devices and creation of reciprocity which define the bonds between IOCoP 
partners” (Ibid.). Both of these features indicate a quick and easy adaptation to 
complexity and unexpected situations (common to megaproject-based organizations), by 
integrating new parties or by modifying the modes of collaboration along the process of 
organizational growth.   
 
A community of practice as an organizational solution to the governance paradox in 
megaprojects is reinforced by the predominant role played by fixed-time horizons and the 
finite nature of megaprojects. This implications of this feature is, we believe, almost 
completely absent from the transaction costs approach to organisations that assumes 
organisations are orientated towards stability, growth and sustainability. In the following 
therefore, we show how communities of practice can address this challenge also.  
 
 
III. NON-PERMANENCY AS A NEW DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF 
MEGAPROJECTS  
 
As stated earlier, Williamson argued that the main determinants of the choice toward the 
most appropriate governance structure were related to high uncertainty, high asset 
specificity, and the high frequency of transactions. Interestingly, the potential 
implications of organizational permanency or ‘temporariness’ is not accounted for in his 
analysis. The identification of megaprojects as a hybrid form of governance structure 
provides an interesting case for this additional variable. The transaction cost approach 
generally claims that the more specific an organisation’s assets are, the more the 
organization should internalize its related activities to reduce its transaction costs 
(assuming a moderate level of uncertainty). According to his conceptualisation of asset-
specificity, Williamson only referred to time-related issues in his notion of “temporal 
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specificity”7. Yet, the concept is used in a significantly different way than the idea of a 
fixed-time horizon developed here. Williamson’s concept is defined as follows: 
“temporal specificity is akin to technological nonseparability and can be thought of as 
a type of site specificity in which timely responsiveness by on-site human assets is 
vital”. (Williamson, 1991: 290-1) 
 
However, it could be argued that time is not correlated to asset specificity but is an 
independent variable which rather directly affects managers’ choices between ‘make’ or 
‘buy’. Hence, the temporary nature of megaprojects, as organisations, challenges 
Williamson’s results – even considering his analysis of hybrid forms.  
 
In particular, the following Table focuses on the degree of asset specificity in transactions 
and distinguishes three different levels: strong (++), semi-strong (+) and weak (0). In the 
traditional case assumed by Williamson (i.e. permanent organizations), the degree of 
asset specificity determines the degree of internalisation. However, in the paradox 
considered here, high asset specificity does impact the choice of governance differently 
than in the case of permanent organizations.   
  
  Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
Permanent 
Organizations 
High Asset 
Specificity 
0 + ++ 
 Low Asset Specificity 
++ + 0 
Megaprojects as 
Temporary 
Organizations 
High Asset 
Specificity 
++ + 0 
 Low Asset Specificity 
++ + 0 
 
Table 3 – Distinguishing Attributes of Market, Hybrid and Hierarchy Governance Structures in 
Permanent and Temporary Organizations (based on Williamson, 1991: 281) 
                                                
7 Williamson distinguishes 6 kinds of asset specificities: (1) site specificity, (2) physical asset specificity, 
(3) human-asset specificity, (4) brand name capital, (5) dedicated assets and (6) temporal specificity. For 
further details about this categorisation, see Williamson, 1991: 281.  
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The time dimension is here considered as a crucial characteristic of the governance 
structure chosen by megaproject managers. Graphically, this idea is expressed by a non-
linear function (S curve) which tends toward internalisation in a permanent context in the 
long-run (with the highest degree of internalisation corresponding to high asset 
specificity). By contrast though, in the case of temporary organisations (such as 
megaprojects), the blue circle drawn on the following graph represents the difficulty for 
managers to internalise in the case of fixed-time horizons.      
 
 
Figure 1 – Temporary Organizations Governance Structures (in the case of high, medium and low 
asset specificity) 
 
 
Interestingly, the unique nature of the megaproject influences the choice of governance. 
To a large extent, stand-alone, highly novel megaprojects (such as major sporting events 
or unique infrastructure) would be located near the blue circle, whereas the success of 
more repetitive ones (such as standard construction or road or rail infrastructure projects) 
would be more likely to be based on a higher degree of internalisation present in the 
north-east section of the graph – assuming similar megaprojects relied on comparable 
resources, transactions and contracts in the past. In particular, repetitive megaprojects 
Time  
Degree of Internalisation 
0 
MARKET 
HYBRID FORM 
HIERARCHY Lower Asset 
Specificity 
Higher Asset 
Specificity 
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would allow the emergence of direct knowledge created in the course of first-hand with 
individuals and due to shared experience and understood communication (Cramton, 
2001: 347).    
 
That is to say the organisational structure is a function of both the asset specificity and 
the level of organizational permanency. As the duration of the project/organization is 
reduced, the optimal strategy is to ‘buy’ and adopt a market structure. As the project time 
increases the structure changes as more is done in-house until a hierarchy is reached. The 
timescale over which these transitions occur depends on the asset specificity; that is to 
say as the asset specificity of the project decreases the time required for a transition 
increases. If the asset specificity is very low then the transition may never occur. Figure 2 
shows the same information as in Table 1 whereby a short-term project (temporary 
organization) is likely to adopt a market structure regardless of asset specificity whereas a 
permanent organisation (large time available and permanency) is more likely to adopt a 
hierarchy as the asset specificity increases. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
From a theoretical perspective, this chapter has shown the extent to which organisational 
theory can enable a better understanding of megaprojects governance structures and 
management. The limits of the transaction cost approach in the explanation of such 
temporary organizations led us to question a governance paradox and paved the way to a 
governance solution based on communities of practice as new forms of governance in the 
case of major projects. These conceptual results linked with the frequent stand-alone 
nature of megaprojects outlined the need for communication and knowledge transfers 
during the interaction in a context of community of practice. This essentially arises from 
the fact that individuals often proceed without common knowledge falsely thinking that 
what is said could be understood on the basis of their own experience and interpretation 
of the situation. As a result, communication should be based on trust-facilitating 
behaviours both to facilitate trust early and to maintain trust later in the project. To a 
certain extent, this idea corroborates existing contributions which refer to social 
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communication and communication of enthusiasm to facilitate early trust and predictable 
communication and substantial and timely responses to maintain trust later (Jarvenpaa, 
Leidner, 1999: 807).    
 
In addition, the non-permanency distinctive feature of megaprojects makes transaction 
costs based solutions difficult to apply in reality. This chapter has shown that beyond 
asset specificity, the level of organizational permanency has a direct influence on the 
governance choice made by the megaproject manager. This result is particularly relevant 
to the case of very large projects but could also be valid in a series of smaller projects.   
 
Two main extensions of this chapter could be made in future research. First, a new 
avenue of research could be explored and debated and is directly linked to the results 
raised by this chapter. Beyond the non-permanency feature of megaprojects, these 
temporary organizational forms are also often defined by virtual teams, that is to say 
megaprojects that rapidly emerge, reorganize and disappear when the deadline is met and 
that gather individuals with diverse skills and competencies who are geographically 
dispersed and culturally different. Communication issues in this category of projects are 
also central to their success. While a series of recent contributions (Bell, Kozlowski, 
2002; Zolin et al., 2004; Gibson, Gibbs, 2006; Wilson et al., 2008) developed research on 
global virtual teams, very little has been made regarding the specificities of megaprojects. 
Second, while this book chapter is, so far, mainly based on theoretical developments, 
future research could be supported by a grounded exploration that outlines the 
communication tools and routines developed in the governance context of a megaproject. 
In analysing these specific governance structures in different categories of megaprojects, 
focus could be made on the emergence of communities of practice as a solution to the 
governance paradox.  	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